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This paper reviews the empirical literature analysing the effects of the EU Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS) on low-carbon technological change. The emerging evidence is assessed, with references to 
both relevant economic concepts and the evolving regulation of the EU ETS through time. The two 
most robust indications of the literature are: a) the EU ETS appears to have been more effective in 
stimulating innovation of low-carbon technologies rather than their adoption; and b) free allocation 
(grandfathering) tended to hamper low-carbon investments in Phases I (2005-2007) and II (2008-2012). 
However, a complete general picture of the impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon technological change 
is missing. The main gap regards the lack of empirical evidence for Phase III (2013-2020). Especially 
econometric studies are few, due to the lack of suitable databases accessible to researchers – a problem 
that the relevant public authorities are urged to address. Thanks to the recent reforms of the EU ETS, 
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1. Introduction 
As time ticks away for drastically reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, low-carbon 
technological change is ever more important for meeting future emissions reduction targets and 
minimising the cost of the effort. The EU, which has been a leader in the fight against climate change 
for over two decades, is committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 (European Commission, 
2018), in line with the Paris Agreement objective to keep the global temperature increase to “well below 
2°C and pursue efforts to keep it to 1.5°C”. Since its adoption, in 2005, the EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) has been the cornerstone of the strategy for decarbonising the EU’s economy and the 
flagship of EU climate policy. The EU ETS is thus expected to have a central role in inducing low-
carbon technological change as needed. However, whether and how the EU ETS plays this role is in 
fact not obvious, as many are the factors internal and external to the system to consider. 
The EU ETS imposes a cap on total emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and 
perfluorocarbons from over 11,000 heavy energy-using and electricity-generating installations and 
aircrafts, covering about 45% of the EU’s overall GHG emissions. The cap, and with it the emissions, 
decline over time. At the end of the current trading period, which is Phase III (2013-2020), the cap will 
reach a level 21% below that of 2005 emissions; by 2030, the final year of Phase IV (2021-2030), 
emissions will have decreased by at least 43% relative to the same year. Simply described, the cap of 
an emissions trading system (ETS) determines the supply of emission allowances, whereas the demand 
for emission allowances depends on output levels and emission intensities of regulated entities. The 
interplay between demand and supply determines the dynamics of the price of emission allowances, 
a.k.a. the carbon price. In theory, the carbon price established by an ETS guarantees that the cap is met 
at minimum cost, meaning that the ETS is cost-effective. In practice, there are different reasons 
(including transaction costs, market power, investors’ myopia and excessive discounting, among others) 
for which the carbon price may deviate from the optimal path, in which case the ETS is not cost-
effective.1 
The EU ETS is a sophisticated policy instrument whose regulation has evolved considerably over 
the years, partly reflecting a learning-by-doing process and partly in response to unanticipated events. 
In 2009, the first major reform of the EU ETS, with effect from Phase III, made the system significantly 
more efficient than in Phases I (2005-2007) and II (2008-2012) through both its centralisation and a 
whole new set of rules for allowance allocation.2 At the very same time, however, Europe was hit by 
the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression, which for the EU ETS meant a sharp 
decline in the demand for emission allowances. In addition to the fall in production, the supply-demand 
imbalance in the allowance market was compounded by the inflow of international credits issued under 
the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, effectively increasing 
                                                          
1 For a theoretical analysis of how an ETS should be evaluated, see Fuss et al. (2018). 
2 For an account of the regulatory changes of the EU ETS through the trading periods, with a focus on allocation 
rules, see Verde et al. (2019). 
allowance supply, and by effective renewable energy policies carried out by members states, resulting 
in further reduced allowance demand. The persistent excess supply, or market surplus, meant that the 
price of emission allowances stayed low for several years. As the level of carbon prices is the first 
determinant of low-carbon investment decisions, most analysts would probably agree that low carbon 
prices have been the main problem faced by the EU ETS since its inception. Steps were taken to address 
the market surplus. The surplus was first tackled through the withdrawal – originally intended to be 
temporary (“backloading”) – of 900 million allowances and, then, in a structural way with the 
establishment of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR)3. Moreover, the reform for Phase IV (European 
Parliament and Council, 2018) has, among other things, tightened allowance supply further and 
enhanced financial support for low-carbon investments through dedicated funds.  
Given the importance of low-carbon technological change for attaining sustainable economic 
prosperity and the importance of the EU ETS – still the world’s largest ETS in operation – as a policy 
supposed to contribute to that end, empirical analyses examining whether and how the EU ETS fulfilled 
this expectation are valuable. This paper reviews the empirical literature on the subject, assessing its 
findings and limitations. The review aims to cover all relevant studies published in specialised journals 
or as working papers up until December 2018.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical background of the 
review. Section 3 presents the studies. Section 4 discusses the emerging evidence. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
This section recalls a few important concepts for evaluating the impact of an ETS, such as the EU ETS 
or other similar systems, on low-carbon technological change. We focus on: a) the distinction between 
innovation and adoption of low-carbon technologies as different responses to carbon pricing; b) the 
main properties of an ETS for its ability to spur low-carbon technological change; and c) the ways in 
which free allocation of emission allowances may affect low-carbon technological change. 
 
2.1 Innovation vs adoption 
In the wide and diverse literature on technological innovation, the word “innovation” can mean different 
things. Notably, it may refer to the process of technological change, encompassing the invention of a 
novel production process or product, its implementation and subsequent diffusion through progressive 
adoption. Or, it may more narrowly refer to the invention of a novel production process or product. The 
terminology of innovation is not more univocal in the more specific domain of environmental 
                                                          
3 The MSR (European Parliament and Council, 2015) is a rule-based mechanism that limits the excess supply and 
excess demand of emission allowances. By introducing some flexibility in allowance supply, the MSR is intended 
to mitigate the impacts on the carbon market of macroeconomic shocks and, for that matter, of any unforeseen 
event or development affecting allowance demand. The MSR has started operating in January 2019.  For in-depth 
analyses of the economics of the MSR, the reader is referred to the dedicated special issue of the Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management (Hepburn et al., 2016). 
innovation, which is innovation benefiting the environment. As a matter of fact, different definitions of 
“eco-innovation” add to ambiguity (Ekins, 2010). For example, the concept of eco-innovation is 
sufficiently wide to include adoption of a technology already used by others, which is, therefore, new 
for the acquiring firm (“new-to-the-firm”) but not for the world (“new-to-the-market”) (Kemp, 2010; 
Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011). In this paper, innovation is intended in the narrower sense just specified.4 
With regard to technological change as a process that can be influenced by economic policy, John 
Hick’s induced innovation hypothesis (IIH) underpins the idea that carbon pricing, whether in the form 
of carbon taxation or emissions trading, can spur novel low-carbon technologies. The IHH postulates 
that an increase in the relative price of a production factor spurs inventions aimed at reducing its use 
(Hicks, 1932). Considering carbon as a production factor, the IIH applies to carbon pricing.5 Of course, 
investing in R&D is not the only way in which a firm may respond to carbon pricing. Most of the time, 
adopting an already existing technology will be the best option for minimising compliance costs.6 From 
the policymaker perspective, however, only innovation (and not adoption) expands the technology set 
(Calel, 2018). This distinction is central in the context of climate change mitigation, as both innovation 
and diffusion (through adoption) of low-carbon technologies are needed to drastically reduce emissions. 
  
2.2 Key properties of an ETS: stringency and predictability 
Johnston et al. (2010) analyse the most important characteristics, or properties, of environmental 
policies for stimulating invention and diffusion of green technologies. By nature, emissions trading 
meets the highest standards for three of the five characteristics identified by the authors: flexibility, 
incidence and depth.7 The same is not true for the other two properties, which are stringency and 
predictability. Whether or, rather, to what extent an ETS is stringent or predictable, depends on its 
specific design. 
The stringency of an environmental policy refers to the ambition of its (explicit or implicit) target 
relative to the alternative (“baseline”) scenario without the policy. For an ETS, this means how stringent 
the cap is relative to the total amount of emissions that would be produced if the ETS was not there. 
Since counterfactual emissions are not observed (they can only be estimated), the price of emission 
allowances, as an indicator of their scarcity, is a proxy for the stringency of an ETS. In general, the 
empirical literature clearly supports the hypothesis that a more stringent environmental policy gives 
economic agents stronger incentives to search for ways to avoid compliance costs, thereby promoting 
technological change (Barbieri et al., 2016). 
                                                          
4 Jaffe et al. (2003) provide a thorough analysis of the literature on environmental innovation produced until then. 
For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on environmental policy and innovation published during 
the past decade, see Popp (2019). 
5 The applicability of the IIH is general, beyond market-based policies and the environmental policy domain. 
6 The outcomes of R&D investments are generally highly uncertain (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000). 
7 “Flexibility” refers to whether the policy encourages novel solutions for reducing the pollutant; “incidence” 
refers to how closely the policy targets the pollutant; and “depth” refers to whether the policy provides continuous 
incentives to develop technologies ever more effective in reducing the pollutant. 
The predictability of an environmental policy refers to the level of (un)certainty with which 
economic agents can expect the policy and its effects to unfold in the future. As technological change 
involves investment decisions, uncertainty can hamper technological change by affecting investors’ 
expectations. Different types of uncertainty exist, however, with potentially different implications for 
technological change. With specific reference to an ETS, Hoffman et al. (2008) provide a taxonomy for 
different types of uncertainty. The authors first distinguish between regulatory and regulation-induced 
uncertainty. Regulatory uncertainty concerns: a) the basic direction of the ETS (related to, e.g., future 
emissions reduction targets, the scope of the system, changes in international climate policy) and its 
very existence; b) the rules for allowance allocation; c) the implementation process (e.g., allocation 
delays); and d) the interdependence with other policies. Regulation-induced uncertainty, by contrast, 
regards the state of the non-regulatory environment. For example, it can be uncertainty about 
competitors’ strategies in the face of regulatory uncertainty or about the price of emission allowances. 
While regulatory uncertainty is considered detrimental to technological change, the same does not 
necessarily apply to regulation-induced uncertainty.  
 
2.3 Free allocation and technological change  
In an ETS, the emission allowances can be distributed to the regulated entities a) for free, in the form 
of grandfathering, benchmarking or output-based allocation, b) through auctions, or c) a mix of these 
methods.8 Minimising the risk of causing market share losses to the advantage of foreign competitors 
and, thereby, minimising the risk of carbon leakage9, is the economic rationale for using free allocation.  
Among the most debated questions on the economics of emissions trading are whether 
grandfathering leads to output and emissions levels different from those achieved under auctioning (or 
a carbon tax) and, related, whether it alters the impact of the policy on technological change by affecting 
investment decisions. The standard answer is that the initial allocation makes no difference in these 
respects (Montgomery, 1972; Hahn and Stavins, 2011; Requate and Unold, 2003). This conclusion, 
however, rests on several assumptions about markets’ structure and firms’ behaviour. Among others, a 
key assumption is that firms fully value the opportunity cost of using free allowances for compliance10 
in the same exact way as if it was a real cost. Increasingly, this assumption has been questioned in light 
                                                          
8  With grandfathering, allowances are allocated in proportion to historical emissions. With benchmarking, 
allowances are allocated according to performance indicators. In practice, allocations are determined by 
multiplying the benchmarks (expressed in terms of emissions per unit of output) by recent output levels. With 
output-based allocation, allowances are allocated in proportion to current production levels.    
9 The displacement of GHG emissions due to differences in the stringency of climate mitigation policies is called 
carbon leakage. There are three main channels through which unilateral climate policy can result in carbon leakage: 
the trade balance (short-term impact), foreign direct investments (long-term impact) and changes in international 
fossil fuel prices. Deterioration of international competitiveness due to climate policy activates the first two 
channels. The third channel, by contrast, can come into play if the region strengthening its climate policy makes 
up a significant share of global fossil fuels demand. 
10 Since they have market value, using (preallocated) allowances for compliance carries an opportunity cost equal 
to the revenue that would be earned if (the corresponding emissions were avoided and) the allowances were sold.   
of insights from behavioural economics, pointing to a negative impact of free allocation on low-carbon 
technological change (Venmans, 2016).11 The same question applies to benchmarked allocation. The 
very purpose of benchmarking, however, is to promote low-carbon technological change by rewarding 
early movers investing in low-carbon technologies (Zipperer et al., 2017). 
The literature identifies at least three other ways in which free allocation may alter the impact of 
an ETS on low-carbon technological change. One is the case of so-called new-entrant provisions, 
whereby a new plant entering the system is entitled to an allowance endowment for the duration of the 
trading period. The rationale for such arrangement – present in the EU ETS, not in other ETSs – is not 
to put new entrants at a disadvantage relative to the incumbents. However, the endowment could 
potentially change the relative convenience of alternative investments, thus affecting the investment 
decision. Unless allocations are determined on a fuel-neutral basis, allowance endowments to new 
entrants introduce a bias in favour of more emission-intensive investments (Åhman et al., 2007; 
Ellerman, 2008; Flues and van Dender, 2017). The second case is the situation where innovation or 
adoption of a low-carbon technology, by a firm holding a significant share of the allowance market, 
would result in a reduction of the allowance price (Fisher et al., 2003). In this case – unlikely in the EU 
ETS given the low concentration of the allowance market –, free allocation may hamper low-carbon 
technological change because the price drop would reduce the value of the allowances hold by the firm 
and, hence, the convenience of the investment. The third case – not applicable to the EU ETS so far – 
refers to output-based allocation. In contrast to the previous cases, here low-carbon technological 
change may be strengthened due to greater production (output-based allocation effectively subsidises 
production) and higher allowance prices (Rosendahl and Storrøsten, 2015). 
 
3. The empirical evidence 
There are several empirical studies examining the effects of the EU ETS on firms’ innovation or 
adoption of low-carbon technologies. Our search led to the identification of 22 such works, which here 
are first divided into two broad groups: the studies using econometrics (7) and those providing 
qualitative or descriptive analyses (15). In addition to this literature, five econometric studies provide 
evidence on the effects of the EU ETS on emission intensity of regulated manufacturing firms. Though 
not focused on technological change, these studies are potentially relevant in that variations in emission 
intensity may reflect changes in the technologies used. 
The literature review below varies in format. In Section 3.1, the econometric studies focused on 
low-carbon technological change are described in detail, one-by-one. The literature providing evidence 
on emission intensity is summarised in the same section, but in a more concise way. In Section 3.2, the 
non-econometric studies are combined together in a single narrative. 
                                                          
11 With reference to the EU ETS, Ellerman (2015) includes opportunity costs among the issues yet to be analysed 
seriously.  
 
3.1 Econometric literature 
3.1.1 Effects on low-carbon technological change 
Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) estimate the impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon patenting. It is a 
study that stands out in the literature for at least four reasons. First, patent counts, while not without 
shortcomings,12 are generally considered one of the most appropriate innovation indicators (Hagedoorn 
and Cloodt, 2003). Second, the firms in the estimation sample operate as many as 80% of all EU ETS 
installations. Third, the approach used, namely difference-in-differences (DiD), offers a clear-cut causal 
interpretation of the estimated effect.13 Fourth, the authors find that the EU ETS was effective in 
spurring low-carbon technology innovation, more so than other studies show or suggest: it is estimated 
that the EU ETS caused an increase of up to 36% in the number of low-carbon patents granted to 
regulated firms, over 2005-2009. Other relevant results are: a) that no evidence of an indirect innovation 
effect on non-regulated firms is found; and b) that the surge in the total number of low-carbon patents 
observed over the study period was primarily driven by rising energy prices. 
Martin et al. (2013) is a second important econometric study investigating the determinants of 
low-carbon innovation, here measured by any R&D activity aimed at curbing emissions or energy 
consumption or at developing products that can help customers reduce their emissions. It uses primary 
data from interviews conducted in 2009 with the managers of 770 manufacturing firms in six European 
countries. The study finds several interesting results. First, the responses indicate that most firms 
engaged in climate-related innovation, and that this effort was focused on process innovation rather 
than product innovation. Crucially, however, no statistically significant difference is found between 
firms regulated by the EU ETS and non-regulated ones. Second, significant differences in the propensity 
to innovate were found across sectors and countries. Third, low-carbon innovation is positively 
associated with firms’ expectations about the stringency of their future allocation. Fourth, firms 
positioned just below the sectoral thresholds for receiving free allowances in Phase III14 engaged more 
strongly in low-carbon innovation. This last result is presented as evidence of free allocation having a 
causal negative effect on low-carbon innovation. 
Schmidt et al. (2012a) analyse the effects of the EU ETS and long-term emission reduction targets, 
as they are perceived (rather than as they are according to objective metrics), on both investments in 
technology adoption and in R&D. The study is based on interviews with managers of 65 electricity-
producing firms and 136 firms providing technology for electricity generation, in seven European 
                                                          
12 Not all innovations are patented, not all patented innovations are eventually adopted. 
13 Typically, in the studies using the DiD approach, regulated firms are first paired through statistical matching 
with similar non-regulated counterparts. The model for the variable of interest is then fitted, including a binary 
regressor indicating whether the firm participates in the EU ETS. The coefficient of this variable measures the 
effect of the EU ETS. For a technical overview of this and similar methods for policy evaluation, see Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009). 
14 The thresholds in question are based on sectoral trade and carbon intensities.  
countries. The effects are measured by the respondents’ answers to the questions about the intensity and 
the direction of innovation investments between two periods: 2000-2004 and 2005-2009. Among other 
results, the authors find evidence that not only did grandfathering of emission allowances hamper 
adoption of low-carbon technologies, but – as anticipated – new-entrant provisions promoted adoption 
of emitting technologies. A second important result is that long-term emission reduction targets are a 
powerful R&D trigger.  
Focusing on Sweden and again using the DiD approach, Lofgren et al. (2014) test for whether 
participation in the EU ETS stimulated investment in low-carbon technologies. The estimation sample 
comprises some 706 Swedish firms, of which 229 are in the EU ETS, from all regulated sectors, plus 
five control non-regulated sectors: the study covers the years 2000 to 2008. Conducting separate but 
similar analyses for investment below and over €1 million (in a year), respectively, different logit model 
specifications are estimated, with the outcome of interest being the probability of low-carbon 
investment. The main result is that statistically significant effects of the EU ETS are not found, either 
for small or for large investments15. Though limited to Swedish firms, the study also reports some 




Borghesi et al. (2015a) investigate whether the EU ETS affected the likelihood of climate-related 
investment (distinguishing between energy efficiency and emissions reduction as aims) undertaken by 
Italian manufacturing firms, 2006-2008. Firm-level probit models are estimated, using Eurostat’s 
Community Innovation Survey as the primary data source. Several explanatory variables are considered: 
some internal to the firm, some external to the firm (still, firm-specific) and policy factors. The effects 
of the EU ETS are specifically captured: a) by a dummy variable identifying regulated sectors; and b) 
(in regressions limited to observations of regulated sectors) by a stringency indicator given by the ratio 
of sectoral emissions to allocated allowances.17 As expected, firms in regulated sectors are more likely 
to make climate-related investments.18 The allocation stringency indicator, however, turns out to be 
negatively correlated with innovation. The authors suggest that this result may be related to one or more 
                                                          
15 Considering the frequency of investment decisions, the analysis would have probably benefited in a significant 
way from longer time coverage. 
16 For example, over the period 2002-2008, out of 229 regulated firms, 70 (i.e., almost a third) made some low-
carbon investment, 40 of which invested more than €1 million in a given year. With reference to the same firms, 
46% of the large investments were in biofuels, 25% in district heating and 22% in energy efficiency; by contrast, 
over half of the small investments were in energy efficiency. The pulp and paper industry and the energy and 
heating sector had the highest shares of investors. Moreover, for regulated firms, fuel use was higher among 
investors compared to non-investors; the converse is true for non-regulated firms.  
17 Four regulated manufacturing sectors are analysed: coke and refining; ceramic and cement; paper and cardboard; 
and metallurgy. 
18 In the study, firms’ participation in the EU ETS is defined at the sectoral level, however. This implies some 
measurement error, since not all firms in a regulated sector fall under the EU ETS.   
of the following: firms’ anticipatory behaviour; sectoral idiosyncratic factors as well as reverse causality 
between allocation and innovation. Yet, further investigation is not undertaken due to data limitations. 
Focusing on firms in the UK, Calel (2018) estimates the effects of the EU ETS on three outcomes: 
low-carbon patenting, low-carbon R&D expenditure and emission intensity. The estimation sample, 
assembled by linking administrative data with business surveys and regulatory records, comprises about 
400 regulated firms and about as many non-regulated matches (i.e., non-regulated firms, very similar 
before the start of regulation), over the period 2000-2012. By comparing regulated firms after falling 
under the EU ETS and the respective non-regulated ones, the author infers that the EU ETS caused an 
average increase of low-carbon patents of about 25%. An effect similar in size is found for low-carbon 
R&D expenditure. By contrast, for emission intensity, no statistically significant difference between 
regulated and non-regulated firms is found. The results are interpreted as indicating that – contrary to 
what one may expect, based on past experiences with other ETSs – the EU ETS has been effective in 
spurring innovation of low-carbon technologies but not their diffusion, as this would have been reflected 
(had it taken place) in emission intensity improvements.  
Compared to the studies above, Bel and Joseph (2018) address a partially different question, as 
they focus on the effect of allowance overallocation. The authors test for whether country-level 
oversupply of free allowances, as measured by allocated allowances exceeding verified emissions, had 
a negative effect on the number of filed low-carbon patents. Data for 28 countries are used, covering 
the period 2005-2012. Some interesting descriptive statistics are reported on the country distribution of 
low-carbon patents, showing Germany to be clearly the innovation leader in Europe. Country-level 
panel data models are then fitted for annual filed patent counts, explained by (lagged) allowance 
oversupply and a number of sectoral and economy-wide control variables (e.g., GDP, sectoral activity 
indices, R&D spending, number of employees in the service sector, share of renewable energy). In all 
model specifications, allowance oversupply turns out to be negatively correlated with the number of 
patents. 
 
3.1.2 Effects on emission intensity 
Several econometric studies provide evidence on the effects of the EU ETS on firms’ emission intensity. 
We focus on those dealing with manufacturing firms, as opposed to electricity producers, because 
variations in emission intensity of the former are more likely to reflect technology changes rather than 
fuel switching.19 This literature is homogeneous in multiple ways. Firstly, the results on emission 
intensity, usually measured by emissions divided by output or by employment, accompany findings on 
other effects of the EU ETS on firms’ economic and environmental performance. More important, the 
approach typically involves firm- or plant-level quasi-experiments, typically of the DiD kind, whereby 
                                                          
19 The empirical studies focusing on electricity generation highlight the effectiveness of the EU ETS in reducing 
emissions through fuel switching (from coal to gas). See, e.g., McGuinness and Ellerman (2008), Delarue et al. 
(2008) and Berghmans et al. (2014). 
the average effect of the EU ETS is inferred by comparing the outcome of interest for regulated firms 
or plants and for similar non-regulated ones. Further, as is true for all other works reviewed in this paper, 
these studies too are limited to Phase I or Phase II. The most salient element of differentiation is the 
country for which the analysis is conducted. A summary of the results of this literature follows. 
Focusing on Germany, Petrick and Wagner (2014) estimate that the EU ETS reduced emission 
intensity of regulated manufacturing plants by 18% and 20% in Phase I and in the first half of Phase II, 
respectively. Further investigations indicate that these changes in emission intensity are mainly 
explained by optimisation of onsite heat generation and fuel switching. Thus, no evidence is found of 
significant technological upgrades. In a similar application to French manufacturing plants, Wagner et 
al. (2014) find a reduction of emission intensity by 8-12%, again in the first three years of Phase II (not 
before). The effect vanishes, however, when the analysis is replicated at the firm level. Nil or very 
modest effects are found by other studies. Looking at regulated firms in Lithuania, Jaraite and Di Maria 
(2016) identify only a slight decrease in emission intensity for the year 2007 (not for 2006 or 2005), 
which appears to be mainly explained by the retirement of old physical assets. Klemetsen et al. (2016) 
find no statistically significant effects of the EU ETS on emissions intensity of regulated manufacturing 
plants in Norway, nor does Calel (2018) (as already said) for regulated firms in the UK.  
 
3.2 Non-econometric literature 
About two thirds of the studies dealing with the effects of the EU ETS on low-carbon technological 
change provide qualitative or descriptive analyses. We found 15 such works, of which 12 are based on 
primary information collected by the authors through ad-hoc interviews, typically with managers of 
regulated firms. These studies tend to be country- and sector-specific. Five of them focus on the 
electricity sector, five on the paper sector and one on the chemicals sector. The remaining four cover 
multiple sectors. Some of them are sufficiently narrow in scope to qualify as case studies. 
Below, we first summarise the evidence from the studies exclusively looking at the electricity 
sector. We then turn to those analysing other sectors. 
 
3.2.1 Electricity sector 
Compared to other sectors, the impact of the EU ETS on technological change in the electricity sector 
has received more attention. There are multiple reasons for this: a) the electricity sector is by far the 
largest regulated sector, both in terms of emissions and number of installations; b) the electricity sector 
is expected to be fully decarbonised before any other major sector; c) certainly in the first years of the 
EU ETS, deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) for fossil fuel electricity generation was the 
main technology option in the EU’s decarbonisation strategy; and d) the rules for free allocation in 
Phases I and II had particularly important implications for investment decisions concerning power 
plants. The most common research questions indeed relate to the consequences of specific allocation 
rules for new and closing installations and to the different factors influencing CCS deployment. 
The literature highlights the perverse incentives associated with the free allocation provisions for 
new installations entering the EU ETS.20 With reference to the first two trading periods, it is shown that 
new-entrant provisions (see Section 2.3) influenced investment decisions about the type of new plants 
to build. The emission allowances granted to new installations improved the economic attractiveness of 
investments in carbon-intensive electricity generation, notably coal-fired plants (Rogge et al., 2011b). 
Most important, these perverse incentives vanished as of Phase III, as electricity producers (with the 
exception of those in lower-income member states) ceased to receive free allowances. In fact, already 
before the start of Phase III,21 the expectation of auctioning is shown to have led to the cancellation of 
some planned investments in coal-fired power plants (Hervé-Mignucci, 2011). 
The literature also clearly documents the initial interest in R&D activities related to CCS. 
However, this interest did not eventually translate into actual CCS deployment for various reasons, 
notably the low level of carbon prices but also social acceptability problems encountered at the local 
level (Hoffman, 2007; Rogge and Hoffmann, 2010; Rogge et al., 2011b).22 In general, the expectation 
of sufficiently high carbon prices in the future and regulatory predictability are the elements that seem 
to matter most for R&D decisions.  
Overall, the impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon technological change in the electricity sector, 
during the first two trading periods, appears to have been moderate. Most often, what impact there was 
came in the form of small-scale investments with short amortisation times (e.g., three to five years) 
improving the efficiency of existing conventional plants (Hoffmann, 2007). Table 2 summarises the 




3.2.2 Other sectors 
Considering the large number of sectors covered by the EU ETS and the limited size of the literature at 
hand (summarised in Table 3), the pulp and paper sector has received a remarkable amount of attention. 
The five non-econometric studies that specifically look at this sector are concordant in concluding that 
the EU ETS had only a modest effect, if any, in driving low-carbon technological change. Carbon prices 
were too low and allocations of free allowances too generous to affect investment decisions. A second 
common conclusion is that other market factors, notably the cost of raw materials and especially energy 
costs, were far more important factors in investment decisions.  Gulbrandsen and Stenqvist (2013) 
document a case study of two Nordic pulp and paper companies that, because of the effect of the EU 
                                                          
20 New-entrant and closure provisions characterise the EU ETS. Previous cap-and-trade schemes did not foresee 
such provisions (see, e.g., Ellerman et al., 2010).   
21 The new allocation rules for Phases III were set out by the second ETS Directive, in 2009: over three years 
before their entry into force. Thus, there was time for investor expectations and investment decisions to adapt to 
the new allocation regime. 
22 For a more in-depth discussion of why so far CCS projects have not been successful, see Ahman et al. (2018). 
ETS on electricity prices, show greater interest in investing in own electricity generation to reduce their 
dependence on wholesale electricity prices. According to Pontoglio (2008) and Gasbarro et al. (2013) 
relevant investments mainly consisted in the adoption of existing technologies for improving core 
process efficiency. Evidence consistent with the limited effect that the EU ETS seems to have had on 
technological change in the pulp and paper sector is provided by Fontini and Pavan (2014). Performing 
an index decomposition of the sectoral emission trends in Italy with 173 Italian plants, the authors show 
that technological change was never a relevant contributor to emission reductions. For Phase I, a 
compositional effect is found, whereby emissions slightly declined thanks to a shift toward less carbon-
intensive types of paper products. For the second trading period, the reduction in emissions was 




The other non-econometric studies bring additional evidence that is largely consistent with the 
results discussed so far. Using information on production costs from four Portuguese companies in the 
chemicals sector, Tomas et al. (2010) show that the EU ETS did not significantly change production 
costs (thus providing no investment incentives), partly because – the authors argue – the allowances 
were grandfathered. Based on interviews with managers from the ceramics, lime and cement sectors, in 
Belgium, Venmans (2016) concludes that a) uncertainty about very low or very high carbon prices in 
the future and b) allowance overallocation were the main factors hindering low-carbon investments. 
Based on interviews with representatives of different industries in eight European countries, Borghesi 
et al. (2015b) investigate whether and how policies and market factors affected eco-innovation. The EU 
ETS turns out to have had a relatively more significant role in the electricity sector than in 
manufacturing sectors, inducing fuel switching and CCS-related activities. Based on questionnaires 
administered to regulated firms in Ireland, Anderson et al. (2010) find that significant low-carbon 
technological change occurred during Phase I. Substantial shares of the respondents stated that they had 
undertaken some technology changes as well as fuel switching and behavioural change. However, it is 
unclear to what extent these were effects of the EU ETS. Finally, Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007) 
document a few cases of firms in the agriculture sector benefitting from different process innovations 
brought about by the EU ETS. 
 
4. Discussion 
Some important indications emerge from the literature presented. We focus on: a) the different effects 
of the EU ETS on innovation and on adoption of low-carbon technologies, and b) the negative effect of 
free allocation on low-carbon technological change. But first of all, let us consider the limitations of the 
literature. 
 
4.1 The general picture is incomplete 
The empirical literature on the effects of the EU ETS on innovation and adoption of low-carbon 
technologies is significant in size and, taken together, offers some robust results. Nevertheless, it falls 
short of providing a complete picture of the impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon technological change. 
The main gap regards the lack of empirical evidence for the last six years or so, as none of the studies 
identified comes up to cover even the beginning of Phase III. This delay of empirical results is 
particularly unfortunate because major changes in the rules for allowance allocation, potentially 
affecting firms’ investment decisions, came into operation in the third trading period. These changes, 
introduced by the second ETS Directive (European Parliament and Council, 2009), include: a) the 
switch from grandfathering to auctioning as default allocation method for the electricity sector, b) 
benchmarked allocation for all other sectors, plus c) progressive expansion of auctioning (free allocation 
shrinking from 80% in 2013 to 30% in 2020) for those identified as not at risk of carbon leakage. These 
regulatory changes point to a potentially stronger impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon technological 
change during Phase III – all the more plausible given the evidence on the effects of free allocation in 
the previous trading periods (see below). On the other hand, again relative to Phases I and II, allowance 





It is thus difficult to guess whether, in the period for which empirical evidence is missing, the EU ETS 
has had a greater or smaller impact on low-carbon technological change than it did in previous years. 
In this sense, the current situation is easier to interpret. The combination of Phase III allocation rules 
and – now – substantial carbon prices, which have much increased since the Reform for Phase IV was 
agreed, suggests that the incentives for innovation and adoption of low-carbon technologies are 
probably stronger today than ever before. 
Other limitations of the literature are related to the small number of econometric studies and of 
sector-specific findings. The small number of econometric studies implies that there are few empirical 
results with statistical relevance, which is what allows drawing conclusions with some general validity. 
For this reason, econometric studies are usually of special interest and, consistent with this view, our 
summary of the econometric literature is more detailed than that of the non-econometric literature. This 
is not to say that econometric studies are superior to non-econometric ones in all respects. The second 
can offer important insights on, for example, agents’ behaviour or specific situations, that the first are 
not able to capture through regression analysis. The scarcity of databases that are both suitable, meaning 
sufficiently large and with sufficiently detailed information on firms’ investments, and usable or easily 
accessible for research purposes, is the main reason for the paucity of econometric works in this field. 
The small number of sector-specific findings implies that the existing evidence is not very 
granular at the sector level. Most results, especially those of econometric applications as they require 
sufficiently numerous observations for parameter identification, refer to aggregates of heterogeneous 
sectors. Notably, this is the case of estimated average effects for the regulated manufacturing sector, 
which in the given application may comprise several diverse subsectors, such as cement, steel, paper, 
glass, etc. With the exceptions of the electricity sector and of the pulp and paper sector, sector-specific 
evidence for the others is very limited or missing. This is a limitation of the literature because sector-
specific evidence can be useful, especially for informing policy adjustments. 
 
4.2 More innovation than adoption  
Despite said limitations, the existing literature gives a rather clear indication on how the EU ETS has 
affected low-carbon technological change. So far, the EU ETS appears to have been more effective in 
stimulating innovation of low-carbon technologies rather than their adoption. To our knowledge, Calel 
(2018) has been the first to note this type of asymmetry, even though his own measure of adoption 
(emission intensity improvement) is only a proxy.  In any case, Calel’s intuition and findings are 
confirmed by our examination of the literature. 
Focusing on the econometric literature, Table 4 compares the direction of estimated effects of the 




In two out of three applications relevant to technology adoption, the effect of the EU ETS on investment 
in existing low-carbon technologies is not statistically significant.23 Borghesi et al. (2015a) find a 
positive effect, though it might be potentially affected by measurement error (see footnote 18). The 
situation is reversed for the effects on innovation. In four out of five applications, with low-carbon R&D 
expenditure or low-carbon patent count as dependent variable, the effect of the EU ETS is positive and 
substantial in magnitude, especially for patenting. The interpretation of the same results can benefit 
from bringing into the picture those of the literature on emission intensity. For manufacturing firms, the 
effects on emission intensity range from moderate to – more often – nil. The very few studies 
investigating how identified emission intensity improvements were achieved indicate that the EU ETS 
mainly induced optimisation of energy use and fuel switching, rather than technology changes. 
These findings invite at least two types of considerations. First, little to no effect of the EU ETS 
on adoption of low-carbon technologies is reason for some concern, as delayed action would normally 
result in higher costs over the long term. The very low carbon prices observed during most of Phase III 
                                                          
23 In our “innovation vs adoption” comparison, emission intensity improvements are not considered because they 
may not exclusively reflect adoption of low-carbon technologies. This does not alter the conclusion about the 
observed asymmetry between innovation and adoption effects. 
add to this concern. On the other hand, the recent reforms of the system (the establishment of the MSR 
and the reform for Phase IV) have radically changed market expectations, as is reflected in the surge of 
allowance prices. Second, the effects on low-carbon innovation seem at odds with the results for 
emission intensity. One might expect that low-carbon innovation would eventually translate into lower 
emission intensity, which is not what the literature shows. What can explain this apparent discrepancy? 
An increase in low-carbon patenting may be quite an imperfect proxy for resulting emission reductions. 
Also, estimated average effects of the EU ETS on emission intensity may hide significant differences 
across sectors. In future, useful empirical research would more clearly identify the links between 
technological change and emission reductions. 
 
4.3 Free allocation: a brake on low-carbon technological change 
The effect of free allocation on technological change is a second important question on which the 
literature examined gives a rather clear indication. Namely, free allocation (grandfathering) tended to 
hamper low-carbon technological change in Phases I and II. The most general explanation is that 
regulated firms undervalue the opportunity cost of using their own free allowances as compared to the 
real cost of purchasing allowances on the market. As a result, through both operational and investment 
decisions, they end up abating fewer emissions than they would if they had fewer or no free 
allowances.24 A more specific mechanism whereby free allocation affected low-carbon technological 
change is that related to new-entrant provisions. The effect was salient in the electricity sector because, 
despite coal and gas can be close substitutes as fuels, allowance allocations for new installations were 
determined based on emissions rather than output (KWh). 
While evidence on how free allocation affected technological change is rather clear, the caveat 
that this result refers to the first two trading period could not be overemphasised. Both the rules for free 
allocation and the volume of free allocation have changed drastically with Phase III. Notably: a) 
auctioning has become the default allocation method for the electricity sector (thus solving the issue of 
new-entrant provisions in that sector); b) while 95% and 90% of all allowances were allocated for free 
in Phases I and II, respectively, the same share has dropped to about 57% (due to auctioning in the 
electricity sector and increasingly limited free allocation for the sectors not at risk of carbon leakage); 
c) the volume of free allowances has also shrunk because the EU ETS cap declines over time; and d) 
benchmarked allocation has replaced grandfathering, introducing a potentially important incentive for 
undertaking technology upgrades.  
Moreover, in general, no definitive judgement on free allocation should be passed without 
considering the costs that may have been avoided thanks to free allocation. That is, one should also 
consider how free allocation performed with respect to its own purpose, which is minimising the risk 
                                                          
24 For an analysis of the different ways in which the perception of free allowance allocations may lead to different 
investment decisions, the reader is referred to Venmans (2016). 
of carbon leakage. The relevant literature indicates that, certainly in the first two trading periods, the 
EU ETS had no significant negative effects on the competitiveness of regulated firms (Verde, 2018). In 
fact, not only was free allocation sufficiently generous to prevent negative competitiveness effects, but 
it also enabled regulated firms (with differences from sector to sector) to gain windfall profits – which 
is also controversial. However, while today it is safe to assume that there were margins for reducing 
free allocation in Phases I and II without consequences in terms of negative competitiveness effects, 
the same cannot be automatically extended to Phase III. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The review of the empirical literature on the effects of the EU ETS on low-carbon technological change 
has highlighted a few robust findings as well as limitations of the same evidence. Concerning the 
findings, we have stressed: a) the stronger effect of the EU ETS on low-carbon innovation rather than 
on adoption; and b) the negative effect of free allocation on low-carbon investments, in the first two 
trading periods. As of Phase III, both extensive auctioning and benchmarked allocation have 
strengthened the incentives for low-carbon investments. However, probably, the benefits of the new 
allocation regime were more than offset by very low allowance prices during most of Phase III. Recently, 
the establishment of the MSR mechanism and the Reform for Phase IV have addressed the problem of 
excessively low prices: the Reform by tightening the cap further, the MSR by (eventually) keeping 
allowance supply-demand imbalances within given boundaries. Though criticised by some for not being 
timely, the regulatory response has proved effective considering the evolution of allowance prices since 
early 2018.25  
Current and prospective allowance prices combined with progressively shrinking free allocation 
(due to the cap declining over time) call for enhanced financial support to low-carbon investments. 
Carbon pricing is gradually spreading around the world (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018), but to be sure 
the achievement of a de facto global carbon price (whether through cooperative processes or 
controversial border adjustments) is not guaranteed or close in time. Support to low-carbon investments, 
towards both innovation and adoption, is thus an increasingly important lever to counter 
competitiveness deterioration (by reducing emission intensity) and mitigate carbon leakage risk.26 
Introduced as part of the Reform for Phase IV, the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund promise 
to be useful tools in this sense. With specific reference to the Innovation Fund, many were the lessons 
learnt from the difficulties incurred with its predecessor NER300 (Åhman et al., 2018; European 
                                                          
25 Still, carbon prices currently prevailing in the EU ETS remain below the lower bound of the price range 
recommended by the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices (2017), for 2020, to meet the 2°C objective of 
the Paris Agreement (US$40-80/tCO2).    
26 In presence of international spillovers, not only can low-carbon innovation mitigate carbon leakage risk, but it 
could also result in negative carbon leakage, that is, lower emissions overseas (Fischer, 2015; Gerlagh and Kuik, 
2014). 
Commission, 2015, 2019), plus its size is expected to be almost five times as big, namely about €10 
billion, compared to €2.1 billion. 
As to the limitations highlighted by the literature review, the small number of econometric studies 
and the lack of results for the last few years have been stressed. At the root of the shortage of 
econometric studies is the scarcity of firm-level databases both suitable in terms of information content 
and accessible to researchers. Badly needed are especially firm-level data on climate-related 
investments, enabling analyses of the diffusion of low-carbon technologies in the economy. An ideal 
database would contain longitudinal data for both regulated and non-regulated firms, as this would 
facilitate econometric analyses identifying causal relationships. Administrative data and business 
surveys maintained by national statistical authorities already generate, or could generate, databases with 
such features. However, often access to these data for research purposes is not allowed or is heavily 
restricted for confidentiality reasons. Given the ever increasing importance of low-carbon technological 
change for society and, therefore, of monitoring whether and how the EU ETS or other policies affect 
it, EU and MS relevant authorities are urged to improve said data and, while ensuring confidentiality as 
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Table 1 – Summary of econometric studies 












Firm level data  
(80% of EU-ETS 
emission covered) 








Positive effect of the EU ETS on the number of low-carbon patents 
(+36% compared to counterfactual).  
No effect of the EU ETS on third parties innovation (i.e. no indirect 
effects). 
Martin et al. 
(2013) 
Firm level data  
(770 firms 
interviewed)  




- Participation in the EU ETS 
(dummy) 
- Expectation on ETS 
stringency (cap and price) 
Multivariate linear 
regression (OLS) 
Non-significant difference between EU ETS and non EU ETS firms 
in inducing innovation. 
Positive effect of expected stringency (on the cap) on R&D 
decisions. 
- Exemption from permit 
auction post-2012 (dummy) 
Regression 
Discontinuity Design 
Negative effect of free allowance allocation on innovation efforts. 
Schmidt et al. 
(2012a) 
Firm level data 
(65 electricity 
producers and 163 
technology 
providers) 
7 MS X X (1) 
Electricity sector 
(2009)  
Low-carbon technology  
Adoption 
Low-carbon R&D 
- Perception of EU ETS in 
phase 1-2 /phase 3 
Multivariate linear 
regression (OLS) 
Negative effect of allowance grandfathering on adoption (it even 
incentivised emitting technologies). 
Non-significant effect of EU ETS perception on adoption of non-
emitting technologies. 
Positive effect of perception of long term emission reduction target 
on low-carbon R&D. 
Lofgren et al. 
(2014) 
Firms level data  
(776 firms of which  
229 are regulated) 
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Low-carbon technology  
Adoption 
- Participation in the EU ETS 
(dummy) 




No significant effect of EU ETS implementation on investment 
behaviour. 
No significant effect of over-allocation on investment behaviour.  
Bel and Joseph 
(2018) 





- Proxy of allowance over-
allocation (2) 
Negative binomial 
panel data.  
Negative effect of allowance over-allocation on low carbon patents.  
Borghesi et al. 
(2015a) 
Firm level data 
1 MS 
(IT) 






- Proxy of allowance over-
allocation (2) 
Probit model  
Negative effect of stringency on innovation (the authors relate this 
counterintuitive result to potential anticipatory behaviour of 
regulated firms or to reverse causality between allocation and 
innovation). 
Calel (2018) Firm level data 
1 MS 
(GB) 
X X  All sectors 
Low-carbon R&D 
Low-carbon patents 
CO2 intensity (proxy of 
adoption) 
- Participation in the EU ETS 
(dummy) 
Matching estimator 
No significant effect of the EU ETS on regulated companies’ carbon 
intensity (i.e. no effect on adoption). 
Positive effect on low-carbon patenting (+25% compared to 
counterfactual). 
Positive effect on low-carbon R&D spending. 
Notes: (1) Despite data was raised from interviews in 2009, the analysis can be understood to cover phase 1, 2 and 3; as the results focus on expectations (Martin et al 2013) or perceptions (Schmidt et al 2012) about 
future EU ETS phases. (2) Proxies of allowance over-allocation refer to different set of similar indicators where allocated allowances are contrasted with verified emissions, but not with a counterfactual scenario where 
firms/countries are allocated differently. We, therefore, refer to this as a proxy to over-allocation rather than to actual over-allocation.  
Table 2 – Summary of non-econometric studies specific to the electricity sector. 
Study Data MS 
Sector (Year 
survey/interview) 
Research Question Main Conclusions 
Reported ETS 
effect (1) 







(Interview to 5 
companies that 






Which way does the EU ETS 
affect technology investment 
decisions that reduce CO2 
emissions? 
- The EU ETS drives small scale investments with short amortization 
times; retrofits (key to this was malus rule of the German’s NAP), 
limited on portfolio choices (fuel choice of new plants), and limited 
effect on R&D investment: 
- Investment on renewable not driven by the EU ETS. 
- Increased interest on CCS related R&D, however considered too risky 
given carbon price level and its volatility. Public perception is a more 
powerful driver. 
- The EU ETS did not affect fuel choice for new plants in the portfolio 
(other factors more important)  
- Organizational changes to control the associated risk with investments 
decisions under the EU ETS. 
- Effort: 2-10 million per investment (amortization 2-5 years). 
- CCS R&D. 
- Retrofits. 
- Organizational (ETS 
risk management). 









Which changes in the 
electricity’s innovation system 
have been triggered by the ETS? 
(changes in innovation system 
include changes in: (i) 
Knowledge and technologies, 
(ii) actors and networks, 
(iii)institutions and (iv) demand) 
- Accelerates investment in new and existing plants (specially in coal-
fired plants). 
- Significant impact on R&D in CCS technologies (also seen as a way to 
protect investment in existing plants). Strong effect on linkages between 
large utilities and technology providers (related with CCS). 
- Additional driver for R&D in energy efficiency (seen as the low risk 
option). 
- Feed-in-tariff systems are more relevant for R&D in renewables. 




- Process innovation 
(increase Energy 
efficiency, R&D on 
CCS) 
- Moderate impact. 




interviews to 61 










phase II was 
already determined 
and phase III details 
publicly available). 
Which is the effect of the ETS 
on R&D, Adoption and 
Organizational change in the 
German power sector? 
 
- The EU ETS has led to a significant intensification of R&D activities 
through three routes that can be differentiated in whether the emissions 
are captured before (IGCC), during (oxyfuel) or after combustion (post-
combustion). 
- Strong increase in corporate CCS research. 
- Heterogeneous effects on R&D for energy efficiency improvements: 
High for coal plants (accelerated previously ongoing R&D) and very 
little for gas plants and wind turbines. 
- Heterogeneous effects on adoption decisions of new plants: Before full 
auctioning, there were perverse incentives for coal plants. For gas plants, 
in contrast, no effect was driven by ETS. 
-Effects on retrofit of existing plants: The EU ETS contributes to 
increase retrofit activities in coal plants. 
- R&D. 
- Retrofits 
(strong for coal 
plants). 
- Process innovation 




- Overall low 
effect, but 
significant effect 
on R&D (CCS), on 
retrofit activities 
for coal plants and 
on organizational 
changes. 
Schmidt et al. 
(2012b) 
Primary 





“How do firms, with diverse 
characteristics, differ regarding 
their contributions to low-
- Results obtained cast doubts upon whether the current policy mix is 
able to trigger the needed acceleration and redirection of technological 
change in the magnitude needed to meet the targets. 
-… -… - Low impact. 
and 135 technology 
providers). 
carbon technological change in 
the power sector?” 
- Many firms appear to be behaviourally unaffected by climate 
regulations (Cluster analysis: BAU cluster, with 40% of the firms, is the 















How the EU ETS influenced 
longer-term impacts considering 
both operating investments and 
financial investments in power 
generation? 
- Since the EU ETS came into force, some investments made are clearly 
in favor of mitigating emissions (although this cannot be attributed to the 
ETS). 
- “The tighter constraint in phase II and expected phase III triggered 
clear investment related responses: highly carbon-emitting plants 
cancelled in favor of plants emitting less CO2 or regulated entities fully 






- Process innovation. 
- Moderate effect 




Notes: (1) Only reported innovation activities that according to the study were entirely or partially induced by the EU ETS.  
 
Table 3 – Summary of non-econometric studies relevant to sectors other than electricity. 
Study Data MS 
Sector (Year 
survey/interview) 
Research Question Main Conclusions 
Reported ETS 
effect (1) 













Which is the role of EU ETS as 
driving factor for eco-
innovations? 
- The majority of the respondents (52%) declared not to have 
realized/planned to introduce technological innovations aimed at 
reducing emissions. The remaining (48%) already realized or developed 
projects for the coming years.  As for the innovation typology, 38% 
were energy-efficient solutions; 24% were directed at the optimisation of 
the production process. 
- Italian paper plants are old on average, and hence there are significant 
margins for improving efficiency (in energy and the use of raw 
materials). 
-Energy prices are more relevant in driving energy efficiency than 
uncertain carbon prices. 
-… -… 
- Low or null 
impact. 
Tomas et al. 
(2010) 
Primary 






How did the EU ETS affect the 
cost structure of the Portuguese 
chemical industry? 
- Limited impact: The cost increases observed were found to be non-
relevant. 
- Grandfathering and low prices cannot act as a stimulus for innovation. 
-… -… 
- Low or null 
impact. 
Anderson et al. 
(2011) 
Primary 
(Mail interviews to 
27 firms, 70% of 






How did to the ETS affect 
technological changes in terms 
of: 
- machinery and equipment 
adoption, 
- process or behavioral change 
using existing equipment, 
- 48% of the respondents report technology adoption. However the EU 
ETS, despite considered, is not the main driver (rising energy prices 
more important). 
- 74% report some form of process/behavioural change with current 
machinery, of which 30% admit some influence (marginal or strong) 
driven by the EU ETS. 







- Process innovation 
(some technological 
adoption, process 
changes and fuel 
switching). 
- Moderate impact. 
- fuel switching and 
- R&D investments 
- 46% report that the EU ETS had influenced the way in which capital 
and investments are analysed. 












How did the EU ETS affect the 
innovation activities of: R&D, 
Adoption (investment in new 
plants or modernization of 
existing ones) and 
Organizational change 
(procedural, structural or vision 
change) in the German Paper 
Industry? 
- Innovation activities are mainly driven by market forces other than the 
EU ETS. 
- The EU ETS has a low relevance for R&D investment: It is considered 
the least relevant factor (More important are: the prices of paper, raw 
material and fuel, and public acceptance). 65% of paper producers 
consider the EU ETS has low relevance and only 21% high relevance 
(lower % for tech-providers). 
- Market factors are more relevant for adoption decisions. Although 37% 
considered the EU ETS of high relevance in adoption decisions. 
- Regulated companies have performed more CO2-related organizational 





- Process innovation 
(mainly organizational). 













Pulp and paper 
Industry 
(2010-2011) 
How did the EU ETS influence 
companies’ Environmental 
Management Systems (EMS) 
and to what extend did it affect 
investment planning of the pre-
existing EMS program? 
- Companies having an EMS better integrate GHG emission monitoring 
and compliance within the existing organization. 
- But cost reduction (and factors other than the EU ETS) is the main 
driver of investment decisions. 
- “Investments in technological innovation to reduce carbon emissions 
are still limited, and investments tend to be mainly focused on market-
available technologies for core processes.” (In any case, not driven by 
the ETS). 
- “The EU ETS has not been able to trigger additional investment in 
technological innovation, despite the presence of an EMS”. 








Pulp and Paper 
Industry 
(2012) 
How have the EU ETS 
influenced the climate strategies 
of two Nordic pulp and paper 
companies? 
- The EU ETS had a rather limited effect on the climate strategies. 
- EUA price is too low and allowances too abundant to underpin 
investment decisions. 
- However, increase of energy prices (perceived as the strongest 
influence of the EU ETS) have reinforced some long-term commitments 
to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions, i.e. greater interest 
for own power assets. 
-… - … 
- Low or null 
effect. 
Borghesi et al 
(2015b) 
Primary 
(29 interviews to 
industry 
associations, other 







6 sectors: energy, 
ceramics, cement, 
paper,  coke and 
refinery 
(2013) 
Did policy support drive eco-
innovations in terms of (i) 
technological and (ii) 
organizational innovations over 
the period 2000-2012? 
- Energy: The EU ETS did not contribute much to technology 
innovation in large combustion plants, but promoted fuel switching, 
CCS related innovations and organizational innovations. 
- Ceramics and cement: innovations driven by market factors, not by 
policy. 
- Paper: innovation driven by energy costs. Possible incremental 
influence of the EU ETS on already ongoing innovation projects. 
- Coke and refinery: Past policies were more relevant for innovation than 
the EU ETS. 
- Fuel 
switching. 
- CCS projects. 




- Moderate effect 
(energy). 






to 16 managers). 
1 MS 
(BE) 
Ceramics, lime and 
cement 
(2012) 
How do managers perceive 
(free) allowance allocation 
above emissions in terms of 
incentives to invest in 
abatement? 
-The vast majority of them thought that allocation below emissions was 
a greater incentive to invest. “Companies combusting natural gas stated 
the availability of excess permits as the main reason for not including 
the carbon advantage of efficiency investments when assessing payback 
values.” 
- Price uncertainty was perceived as a risk to be minimized, and hence, 
an incentive for low carbon investment. “Avoiding uncertainty from the 
EU ETS was an important motivation to invest in energy efficiency, 
certainly for future projects when companies are likely to be allocated 
below emissions”. However, when the price volatility is faced directly, 
certain price vs uncertain price, most perceived uncertainty as a 
disincentive. 





description of three 
cases that were 
possible because of 







How does the EU ETS stimulate 
the technological and process 
innovations? 
- Carbon emissions from a refinery are used by horticulture farmers, 
who otherwise would have needed to burn gas (to generate fertilizer). 
This already known technology only became economical once carbon 
had a price. 
- Methane captures and generation of renewable energy are becoming 
more profitable thanks to the EU ETS. 








Paper and pulp 
industry 
(2005-2010) 
Index decomposition of the 
variation in emission in terms of 
composition, technic and scale 
effects. 
- In phase I, there was a reduction emission via composition effect: shift 
in production towards products that cause less carbon emissions. This 
trend could be driven by either change in production or change in 
demand. 
- In phase II, technological change played a contribution, but the scale 
effect (decrease in overall output) always dominated emission reduction, 
in both phases I and II. 
-… -… 
- Low effect 
(potentially only, as 
the method does 
not allow to 
identify the EU 
ETS effect). 
















Table 4 – Effects of the EU ETS on innovation and adoption of low-carbon technologies (econometric literature). 
 Effect of the EU ETS 
Study 
Innovation 
(Low-carbon R&D or patenting) 
Adoption 
(Investment in existing low-carbon technologies) 
Schmidt et al. (2012a) + (R&D)  
Schmidt et al. (2012a)  0 
Martin et al. (2013) 0 (R&D)  
Lofgren et al. (2014)  0 
Borghesi et al. (2015a)  + 
Calel and Dechezlepretre (2016) + (Patenting)  
Calel (2018) + (R&D)  
Calel (2018) + (Patenting)  
 
 
Figure 1 – Spot price of European emission allowances (settlement price). 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
